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For much of 1978, Congress and the Administration 
were caught in a dilemma. They wanted to reduce 
inflation but feared that any anti-inflation move 
could easily cause a recession and thereby push un-
employment to high levels. President Carter's de-
cision in the fall of 1978 to inaugurate a new program 
to fight inflation and stop the decline of the dollar was 
therefore extremely difficult. The first part of the 
program, consisting mainly of guidelines for wages 
and prices, has done little to change the outlook for 
inflation. However, the second part of the program — 
with its efforts to slow the growth of money, cut the 
costs of government regulation, and support the dol-
lar in foreign exchange—is a necessary step toward a 
stronger dollar and more moderate inflation, and it 
has not seriously increased the chances of a recession. 
This is not to say there is no chance of a reces-
sion. For example, if the political turmoil in Iran were 
to cause a major disruption in oil supplies, it could 
precipitate a more serious slowdown than we are 
projecting. And similar kinds of economic shocks 
could do the same. The program itself, however, is a 
sound way to fight inflation and promote economic 
stability in the long run, and it is not likely to cause 
the recession so many predict. 
Before the Fall 
Inflation became the nation s 
most serious economic problem 
Before the fall policy changes, most of the people in a 
position to make decisions for the government were 
concerned primarily with output, not inflation. Per-
haps they were particularly sensitive about output 
because the gross national product (GNP), adjusted 
for inflation, actually declined in the first quarter of 
1978, raising fears of a recession. 
The growth in real output, though, was not a 
serious problem. It recovered in the second quarter 
and continued at near its trend rate during the third 
quarter, according to the data available in October. 
Based on what was known then, it was more reason-
able to predict that real output would continue to 
grow steadily than that it would decline. In the third 
quarter, real final sales rose at a 4 percent rate, only 
slightly below the rate experienced during recent 
strong growth years. New orders for equipment and 
new contracts for business structures advanced strong-
ly, suggesting that business investment would continue 
to grow. Construction of new homes continued at an 
unexpectedly strong pace, despite high mortgage 
rates. The composite index of leading indicators con-
tinued to advance. Finally, there were no serious 
overall weaknesses or sectoral imbalances in the 
economy which could have prevented continued ex-
pansion. The main cause for concern was the falling 
exchange rate of the dollar. If the dollar's problems 
got no worse, however, the real economy looked like 
it would grow 3.5 to 4 percent in 1979, and there 
seemed to be little danger of a recession. 
Some effort to control inflation, though, was be-
coming increasingly necessary. The rate of inflation, 
which averaged less than 7 percent during 1977, 
jumped to nearly 10 percent during the first half of 
1978. Meanwhile, public opinion polls began to show 
that inflation was bothering people more than any 
other economic problem in the country. In October, 
before the President's policy announcements, infla-
tion looked like it was going to be worse in 1979 than 
in 1978. 
5 It looked like it would be getting worse princi-
pally because of accommodating economic policies. 
The projected budget deficit for the 1978 fiscal year, 
for instance, was going to be extremely large—$50 
billion. The growth in the money supply, which had 
been quite rapid, showed no signs of slowing. And the 
new social security and minimum wage laws were 
certain to push up the cost of labor. 
Such policies produced continued deterioration 
of the value of the dollar in foreign exchange, a dete-
rioration that sometimes made the dollar's loss of 
purchasing power at home look mild in comparison. 
Against the Japanese yen, the dollar dived 27 percent 
during the first ten months of 1978. Relative to a 
basket of foreign currencies, it declined 8.6 percent. 
This drop in the dollar might appear to matter 
only to tourists and multinational corporations, but it 
comes back to haunt the domestic economy. It makes 
domestic goods cheaper abroad, thus increasing the 
demand for them and raising their prices. In addition, 
it makes imported goods like cars and televisions 
more expensive and tempts domestic manufacturers 
to raise the prices of goods that compete with im-
ports. By these means, the drop in the dollar gets 
translated into greater domestic inflation. And that's 
not the end of the trouble. As the dollar's inter-
national losses add to domestic inflation, people see 
that the dollar is not holding its purchasing power. 
They try to sell their dollars, and once again the 
exchange value of the dollar drops, starting the cycle 
all over again. 
But even if the international pressures on infla-
tion had disappeared, the domestic pressures from 
monetary and fiscal policy and new wage-related legis-
lation would have been enough to keep inflation 
accelerating. In October 1978, because of these do-
mestic pressures, inflation seemed destined to rise to 
8 or 9 percent in 1979, even if the international prob-
lems were solved. 
The government acted cautiously 
For much of 1978, although output was normal and 
inflation was rising, the government moved cautiously 
on inflation. In the spring, the Administration tried to 
postpone and reduce the tax cut it had proposed 
earlier. It also revised the projected federal deficit in 
late summer. It cut the January projections for the 
deficits for each of the next two fiscal years by $10 
billion to $20 billion. These reductions came about 
largely because federal outlays were less and tax 
revenues greater than originally foreseen, not because 
the Administration had planned a major change of 
policy. But fiscal policy was beginning to acknowledge 
the inflation problem. 
Monetary policy, however, was not. Back in 1977, 
Ml, the sum of currency and private checking ac-
counts, had grown at about an 8 percent rate. In 1978, 
when the rate of inflation was accelerating, the 
growth of the money supply continued at about an 8 
percent annual rate, much faster than the target an-
nounced by the Federal Reserve. 
Some forecasters expected a recession 
The government's initial caution on inflation received 
the support of the many forecasters who expected a 
recession. One of their reasons for expecting a reces-
sion was that the current recovery was older than 
average and thus had a good chance of dying. This 
was not a convincing argument, however. The re-
covery was indeed older than the average, but there 
are no natural laws that prevent a recovery from 
continuing long past the average. 
Another of their reasons for expecting a reces-
sion was that businesses would unintentionally cause 
one. Businesses, these forecasters predicted, would 
accumulate excessive inventories by the end of 1978 
and would consequently have to reduce production 
during 1979. This argument was not convincing 
either. Although inventories vary over the course of 
the business cycle, businesses have not regularly 
accumulated large inventories before a recession. To 
do this in such a predictable way would be to make 
costly and avoidable mistakes. Companies that do 
this would lose profits and risk being driven out of 
business by shrewder competitors. Businesses have 
doubtlessly made errors, some of which may have led 
to a recession. But they have not made systematic or 
predictable ones—the kind that foreshadow reces-
sions or other economic events. And the data show 
this. In recent history, businesses have tended to 
reduce their inventories after a recession was in prog-
ress, not before it began. Clearly, these inventory 
reductions were a reaction to the recession, not a 
cause of it. 
Some of the forecasters who predicted a reces-
sion also thought that consumers would unintention-
ally cause one. They believed that consumers, who 
had been buying goods in anticipation of further 
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borrowing as much, which would lead to a recession. 
The evidence, however, did not necessarily suggest 
that consumers were buying goods in anticipation of 
inflation. The greater consumer debt could have 
been explained simply by the increase in the number 
of people aged 25 to 35 who usually carry larger 
debts. Moreover, even if consumers had been buying 
goods in anticipation of inflation, they wouldn't have 
to stop as long as inflation continued to push up 
incomes along with prices. 
In the fall of 1978, in sum, all the evidence sug-
gested that businesses would keep producing, con-
sumers would keep spending, and the economy 
would keep growing strongly throughout 1979. 
The Fall Anti-Inflation Program 
A Disappointing Guidelines Program 
As it became clear that inflation was the nation's 
biggest economic problem, President Carter began to 
take more decisive steps. He made public the first 
part of his anti-inflation plan, the guidelines program, 
on October 24. This program had three main points: 
• Wage and price guidelines. Total labor compen-
sation, including fringe benefits, was restricted to 
an increase of no more than 7 percent. The total 
price increase was limited to V2 percentage point 
below the 1976-77 average increase or to about 5.7 
percent. As an alternative, businesses could keep 
the same profit margin that they had had in those 
years. Compliance was supposedly voluntary, but 
firms that didn't comply could lose important gov-
ernment contracts. 
• Real wage insurance for workers who accept con-
tracts within these guidelines. Subject to the approval 
of Congress, such workers would receive a tax credit 
to make up for their losses in purchasing power if the 
actual inflation rate exceeded 7 percent. 
• A reduction in the federal deficit for fiscal year 1980 
to $30 billion or less. 
These points are still part of the Administration's anti-
inflation program, although some have since been 
modified. At the time they were announced, Presi-
dent Carter apparently had no plans to expand the 
anti-inflation program. He presented these elements 
as if they were complete and sufficient. 
This program was an attack on the wrong front. 
The guidelines, for instance, could not be very effec-
tive. In the United States, wage and price restrictions 
have worked temporarily if at all. They have man-
aged to hold prices down for a short while, but the 
longer they were in force, the more serious problems 
they caused—and as soon as they were removed, 
prices moved quickly back to where they would have 
been.
1 Wage and price guidelines have always failed 
because they have no bearing on the actual causes of 
inflation and therefore have little impact on inflation 
one way or the other. 
The proposal to establish real wage insurance 
promised to be even less effective. Although its pur-
pose was to protect labor in the event that the other 
parts of the program did not succeed, it could be 
disastrously inflationary. The Administration appar-
ently believed that keeping wages down had a good 
chance of keeping inflation down, so that wage in-
surance would be an inexpensive gesture. But sup-
pose this didn't work. What if labor cooperated and 
there was a drought, an oil embargo, or a war some-
where that disrupted our economy? Such events—by 
no means unlikely—could cause more inflation than 
the Administration hoped for, forcing the govern-
ment to shell out billions of dollars at a time when it 
should be reducing expenditures. If the wage insur-
ance plan had economy-wide coverage, it could cost 
the government up to $11 billion for each percentage 
point the inflation rate exceeded 7 percent. Under 
the wage insurance scheme, more inflation would 
quickly create large deficits. But these large deficits, 
in turn, would create more inflation. Then the govern-
ment would have to pay out more and more insurance 
money, and the destructive process would continue. 
Noting this possibility, the Administration put limits 
on how much it would pay out. 
The Administration's pledge to hold the 1980 
deficit to $30 billion was the one substantive an-
nouncement of October 24. Unfortunately, the credi-
bility of this announcement was undercut by the 
'For further discussion of the problems with wage and price con-
trols, see Charles H. Whiteman, "A New Investigation of the Impact of 
Wage and Price Controls," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review, Spring 1978, pp. 2-8. 
7 weakness of the other parts of the program. 
As a whole, the guidelines program did not attack 
the causes of inflation. The heavy reliance on wage 
and price guidelines and real wage insurance— rather 
than the government deficit—suggested that the pri-
vate sector—not Washington, D.C. — was to blame 
for inflation. While the deficit is not the only cause of 
inflation, it is the major factor that the Administra-
tion and Congress have reasonable and legitimate 
control over, and it is a key means by which govern-
ment policies are translated into future inflation. 
The judgment of the marketplace was that this 
program was weak. On the day after the President's 
announcement, both short- and long-term interest 
rates rose, indicating that people expected a higher 
GNP. A higher GNP could be the result of either 
more inflation or more production. But if people 
expected more production, the stock market should 
have done well; instead, it fell. The most consistent 
explanation for this was that people expected higher 
inflation. In other words, interest rates were up be-
cause the inflation premium—the amount borrowers 
were willing to pay to compensate lenders for the 
effects of inflation—was up. To complete the picture, 
the foreign exchange value of the dollar fell dramati-
cally, because fewer people in international markets 
wanted to hold dollars if inflation in the United States 
was going to get worse. The policy initiatives of Octo-
ber 24 clearly did not improve the market's outlook 
for inflation in 1979. 
A Gratifying Dollar Defense Program 
The market's distaste for the guidelines program was 
not lost on the Administration. Seeing that a new 
direction for policy was necessary, President Carter 
announced the second part of his anti-inflation pro-
gram on November 1. This part of the program, 
which is sometimes called the dollar defense pro-
gram, also had three main points: 
• Slower money growth. This was to be accomplished 
by increasing the discount rate (the interest rate 
banks pay to the Federal Reserve for short-term 
loans), the federal funds rate (the interest rate 
banks pay each other for short-term loans), and the 
reserve requirements (the funds member banks 
must keep at the Federal Reserve) on large time 
deposits. 
• An attempt to cut the costs of government regula-
tion. 
• A program to intervene in foreign exchange mar-
kets, raising $30 billion to maintain the value of the 
dollar. 
These measures were a major offensive against 
inflation. The increase in the discount rate, the fed-
eral funds rate, and the reserve requirements promised 
to stem the growth of the money supply and reduce 
the demand for goods and services both domestically 
and internationally, thus lowering inflation. The at-
tempt to cut the costs of government regulation would 
lower inflation by removing some unnecessary ex-
penses for both government and private industry. 
The plan to rescue the dollar would also lower infla-
tion by slowing down the vicious inflationary spiral 
started by the dollar's falling exchange rate. If the 
dollar became stable, at least some of the pressures 
that produced accelerating inflation would be elim-
inated.
2 
Assuming that the attempts to control wages and 
prices that were announced earlier would not have 
any adverse affects, it was reasonable to predict after 
the President's second announcement that the slower 
money growth, the more efficient regulation, and the 
more stable dollar would succeed in lowering infla-
tion. In the context of these measures, the budget 
proposal from the President's first announcement— 
the S30 billion projected deficit for fiscal 1980— 
looked more believable. Reducing the deficit would 
certainly reduce inflationary pressures, especially in 
combination with the other measures. 
2In "International Monetary Reform: The Feasible Alternatives" 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Summer 
1978, pp. 2-7), John Kareken and Neil Wallace demonstrate that float-
ing exchange rates do not provide a stable international monetary 
system unless each country restricts the movement of capital to other 
countries. While the U.S. has had floating rates, it has not had capital 
controls. It has thus had to deal with an unstable exchange rate. 
The only other stable system, Kareken and Wallace explain, is for 
countries to agree on fixed exchange rates and coordinated budget 
policies. The anti-inflation program is a step in the direction of this 
alternative system. The recent moves to support the dollar are tech-
niques for fixing exchange rates; the recent moves to make the U.S. 
deficit and inflation comparable to those of other countries are tech-
niques for coordinating budget policies. These policy actions should 
thus help to stabilize the dollar, but they provide only the first step 
toward stabilizing the international monetary system in the long run. 
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A Recession: Possible But Not Likely 
At present, it still appears that the anti-inflation pro-
gram, despite some weaknesses, will help to reduce 
inflation. In addition, it appears that it will not cause a 
recession, because it is lowering people's expecta-
tions of inflation. When people expect the rate of 
inflation to be lower, interest rates are lower than 
they otherwise would be because the inflation pre-
mium shrinks. Contracts negotiated on the basis of 
expected inflation, such as labor contracts, also in-
corporate a smaller inflation premium. All this lowers 
costs for businesses and reduces inflation, but does 
not necessarily reduce output. 
In contrast, when people do not expect inflation 
to come down, or when they are surprised by a new 
policy, then an effort to make policy tighter could 
affect economic growth. If tighter policies come as 
surprises, wages keep rising because workers' con-
tracts were written in expectation of more inflation 
and cannot be changed. But businesses cannot raise 
prices as fast without losing customers, since other 
prices aren't rising as fast as expected. Workers thus 
become more and more expensive until some are 
actually paid more than the value of what they pro-
duce. Some workers, then, will be laid off. This is why 
government leaders were worried that actions to fight 
inflation would lead to higher unemployment and 
lower output. 
The fall anti-inflation program will probably have 
mixed results, since it was neither totally anticipated 
nor totally unanticipated. The program itself came as 
a surprise, but once it was announced people seemed 
to expect a lower rate of inflation. Immediately fol-
lowing the announcement of the dollar defense pro-
gram, for example, short-term interest rates rose and 
long-term interest rates fell. The rise in short-term 
rates was a predictable response to the Federal Re-
serve's attempt to slow the growth of money by mak-
ing banks pay more for credit. It indicates little about 
people's expectations of inflation in the long run. The 
drop in long-term rates, however, signals that people 
expect either lower output or lower inflation in the 
next few years. If they were expecting lower output, 
the stock market logically should have declined, but 
in fact it shot up. This suggests that people are expect-
ing lower inflation. The increase in the value of the 
dollar in foreign exchange further suggests that peo-
ple are expecting an improvement in inflation, not a 
big drop in output. 
All this is good news. As these expectations get 
incorporated in other interest rates and labor con-
tracts, some inflationary pressures will be relieved. 
The more widely the success of the policy actions is 
anticipated, the more inflation can be reduced with-
out cutting into output or employment. 
Continued But More Moderate Growth in 1979 
While the fall policy actions, particularly the dollar 
defense program, have improved the longer-term 
prospects for the economy, there is likely to be a 
small short-term pause in economic growth. A reason-
able expectation for the year-over-year average real 
growth for 1979 is now in the range of 3 to 3.5 percent, 
mainly because short-term interest rates will weaken 
housing and business inventory accumulation. 
Although the fall policy changes will make real 
growth less than it might have been, they were proba-
bly not a large enough surprise to the economy to 
precipitate a recession. Furthermore, one key indica-
tor suggests that a recession is not likely: the oppos-
ing behavior of housing and business fixed invest-
ment. In the United States since World War II, 
neither business fixed investment nor housing by it-
self has been a good indicator of a recession, but 
together they have been reliable indicators. When 
housing has turned down and business fixed invest-
ment has remained strong, there has not been a reces-
sion. This has happened at least three times in the last 
thirty years and appears to be happening again. 
Whatever happens to housing in 1979, real busi-
ness fixed investment should continue to grow. It has 
not slumped or shown signs of a slump since the fall 
policy actions. New orders for nondefense capital 
goods grew at a rapid pace through the fall of 1978. 
This indicates that businesses will continue to pur-
chase equipment well into 1979, especially since large 
backlogs of orders have accumulated. New contracts 
for nonresidential building rose at a 20 to 30 percent 
rate through most of 1978, indicating that businesses 
will continue to expand their plants well into 1979. 
Two surveys on total business investment in plant and 
equipment forecast continued growth in 1979, al-
though at somewhat different rates. The Bureau of 
9 Economic Analysis survey, the more pessimistic 
view, predicts that business investment in 1979 will be 
11 percent higher than in 1978. The more optimistic 
survey, that of the Conference Board, predicts that it 
will be some 20 percent higher. It looks safe to say 
that business fixed investment will still grow in 1979. 
As long as it keeps growing, the economy should 
avoid a recession even with a downturn in housing. 
Why is business fixed investment looking so 
strong? Business expenditures on plant and equip-
ment, far from being hurt by the anti-inflation pro-
gram, are actually stimulated by it. The announce-
ment of a definite program eliminates some of the 
uncertainty about future government policies and 
thereby reduces some of the risk of long-term invest-
ment in plant and equipment. If the program really 
does reduce inflationary expectations, businesses 
may also be paying a lower inflation premium in their 
long-term interest rates. 
The Success of the Anti-Inflation Program 
Although the anti-inflation program will have posi-
tive results, its success will be hard to see in the data 
for some time to come. The data cannot show that 
inflation would have been much, much worse if noth-
ing had been done to stabilize the dollar. In addition, 
the published price indexes will reflect contracts 
signed well before the fall policy announcements, 
before most people were seriously expecting lower 
inflation. Customary pass-throughs of increased costs 
for higher minimum wages and social security taxes 
will also be reflected in the early 1979 price data. 
Consequently, prices are likely to continue to climb 
at about the 1978 rates or perhaps even higher. Infla-
tion in 1979 should be significantly lower than it other-
wise would have been—but this means that it will not 
be much better than the nearly 8 percent it averaged 
in 1978. 
The fall policy changes, in brief, have improved 
the outlook for inflation and have not substantially al-
tered the chances of a recession. While a recession is 
not the most likely event in 1979, neither is it an event 
with zero probability. Nevertheless, the Administra-
tion's decision to change policy still looks reasonable. 
When choosing between two policies with roughly 
the same chances of leading to a recession, the 
Administration chose the one that could do the most 
to fight inflation. Politically as well as economically, 
this seems to be the right decision because the econ-
omy is still fundamentally strong and because people 
are more worried about inflation than any other 
economic problem. 
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